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 Introduction  
 
 We live in a consumer society, and a good part of our daily decisions revolve around 
buying and sometimes also selling. Thus the reservation prices, the prices we are just willing 
to pay or accept for an item, have become an increasingly important variable in our economy. 
Yet an anomaly has been found when comparing the values obtained by different elicitation 
procedures: not only do the hypothetical values remarkably differ from the values in a real 
market setting, but also a significant discrepancy has been found between the amount people 
are willing to pay to acquire an object, and the amount they are willing to accept to part with 
it if it is in their possession. This discrepancy has proven to be robust and thus to have a 
noticeable impact on standard economic theories and the daily market transactions.   
Consequently a lot of theories have been devised to explain these new findings, the 
most commonly accepted being the Endowment Effect theory by Thaler (1980), later 
elaborated by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), the concept of loss aversion and the 
status quo bias. 
Whereas the endowment effect has first been described for consumer goods, later 
studies have shown that it will also manifest itself for public goods or intangible items like 
time or information. As a psychological phenomenon, it is subject to differences in magnitude 
depending on situational factors as well as personal characteristics of the agents. It seems 
further noteworthy that the endowment effect cannot be accurately predicted during a trade, 
neither for our own changes in valuations nor for another agents’, even though it is 
omnipresent in our everyday life. This leaves room for a multitude of possible applications of 
this theory once it is thoroughly explored and understood.    
The following work tries to give a survey of the most important aspects of the 
endowment effect described in the contemporary literature, introducing the theoretical 
background and different theories explaining the discrepancy between willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept in the first part, then rounding up the different factors that can influence 
the presence and magnitude of the endowment effect in the second part, as well as some 
psychological aspects in the third part, finally presenting possible practical applications and 
some suggestions for future research in parts four and five. 
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 I. Theoretical background 
 
1. Definitions 
 
“Willingness to pay” (WTP) is the value a person attributes to a good and is willing to 
pay, sacrifice or exchange in order to obtain the good or service. WTP is therefore the 
maximum buying price that an individual would pay to obtain a good.  
Respectively, the “willingness to accept” (WTA) is the stated price that an individual 
is willing to accept in compensation for the loss of a good in their possession, also known as 
the minimum selling price or the reservation price.  
Knowing the values of these two variables is very significant since they are often used 
as the basis for economic theories and major public policy decisions. In the following I shall 
discuss some ways of measuring these values as well as the explanations that have been 
proposed in the literature to explain the gap that has been discovered between them.  
 
2. Measures  
 
Various methods to elicit valuations have been used in past experiments involving 
incentives and market environments, not all of them equally incentive compatible, such as 
Smith auctions, binary choice designs, Vickrey auctions and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
("BDM") method, which is explained hereafter.  
   
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) designed a procedure that would give utility 
maximizers, as modern economic theories usually expect agents to be, the incentive to reveal 
their true reservation price. 
In the BDM method, both sellers and buyers face a random bid after stating their own 
reservation prices. Owners willing to trade for a price lower than or equal to the random bid 
will sell the good they own and receive the randomly selected price. In the same way, buyers 
who were willing to pay at least as much as the random bid will acquire the good at the 
random price. Sellers with a reservation price higher than the random bid will not trade, and 
neither will buyers who bid lower than the random price.  
Both sellers and buyers have an incentive to state their true reservation price, since 
neither can influence the actual trading price, nor gain from misrepresentation, but only miss 
some desirable selling opportunities or be forced to enter into some undesirable transactions. 
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 3. Disparity 
 
 The discrepancy between WTA and WTP was first discovered in surveys trying to 
elicit money values of public goods using contingent valuation. By asking people either how 
much they would be willing to pay for an improvement of a public good or how much money 
they would demand to accept a deterioration of the good, researchers noticed that the way the 
questions were phrased made a great difference. The values of hypothetical WTA proved to 
be much higher than the values of hypothetical WTP. These findings inspired a series of 
examinations in an experimental setting with real money and goods.  
Knetsch and Sinden (1984) for example ran an experiment in which participants were 
initially given either a lottery ticket or $3.00. The subjects later had the possibility to trade 
one for the other. Since the initial assignment was random, theory would predict 
approximately half the participants in each group preferring what they got, and half the 
participants preferring the other option and therefore willing to trade. Yet significantly fewer 
subjects from either group chose to exchange goods, the experiment thus showing that 
subjects were somehow reluctant to give up what they had.  
 
4. Hypothetical vs. real values 
 
Brookshire and Coursey (1987) compared elicitation procedures for public goods.  
They investigated resident’s valuations of either an increase or a decrease of the tree density 
of a public park in Fort Collins, Colorado, collecting data in a one-square-mile area around 
the park in three different ways.  
The traditional Contingent Valuation Method was used as the hypothetical, non-
market elicitation process. People were asked what minimum dollar amount their household 
would be willing to accept for a decrease in the base plan of trees by a certain number, or 
what maximum dollar amount their household would be willing to contribute to a fund for the 
increase of trees in the park. A field Smith Auction Process that added the context of other 
people’s bids to the valuation was used to create a market-like setting. To elicit WTP values, 
people were asked how much they would be willing to contribute to a fund for the planting of 
additional trees, under the consideration that they would eventually pay either nothing if the 
sum of all neighbours’ payments was too low to cover the costs of the additional trees, exactly 
the dollar amount they stated if the collected sum was equal to the resulting costs, or 
proportionally less if the sum of the contributed money exceeded the costs of the trees. The 
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 same logic applied for elicited WTA values. Finally a laboratory Smith Auction was used to 
examine valuations in a repetitive market-like environment, based on the same process of 
collecting money, but using actual payments after up to five auction rounds.  
The results show an approximately seventy-five-to-one ratio between WTA and WTP 
using the field instruments, but only a ratio of about five-to-one in the final trial values of 
laboratory results. Further, the dynamics of the laboratory auction biddings show that while 
the values for WTA and WTP converge over the trials, there is a difference in magnitude: 
compensation demand values drop much more than the willingness to contribute increases.  
This leads Brookshire and Coursey to conclude that “the magnitude of the loss-
aversion phenomenon is sensitive to the degree in which values are measured in a market or 
nonmarket environment” (p. 565) and that “hypothetical willingness-to-pay values may be 
both more accurate and more stable than hypothetical willingness-to-accept values.”(p. 565)  
 
Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze (1987) conducted an experiment where subjects were 
either offered payment to taste a bitter-unpleasant substance (WTA) or could offer to pay to 
avoid tasting the substance (WTP). The individual values were collected first hypothetically 
and then using a Vickrey auction setting with trial rounds to allow learning and full 
understanding of the experiment. The results suggest that hypothetical WTA values are likely 
to be biased upwards by psychological factors, whereas hypothetical WTP values are much 
closer to market values. Another conclusion was that “values for WTA and WTP tend to 
converge in a mature market setting.” (p. 688) 
 
Nape, Frykblom, Harrison, and Lesley (2003) compared values for WTA in real and 
hypothetical treatments to find that the hypothetical bias is influenced by certain socio-
demographic characteristics like age, race and personal income. For an elaboration on socio-
demographic factors that have an influence on the real gap between WTA and WTP, see 
section II.2.   
 
By now, there has been plenty of experimental evidence of the discrepancy between 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept so that it is now generally accepted. However, 
there has been no consensus yet as to the cause of this discrepancy. Some theories shall be 
elaborated hereafter, the most commonly accepted of them being the endowment effect. 
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 5. Theories explaining the disparity 
 
  5.1 The endowment effect 
 
The most famous article and the basis of the theory about the endowment effect 
presents a series of experiments from Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) who examined 
alternative explanations for the previously observed systematic discrepancy between buying 
and selling prices, to show that “many discrepancies between WTA and WTP, far from being 
a mistake, reflect a genuine effect of reference positions on preferences. Thaler (1980) 
labeled the increased value of a good to an individual when the good becomes part of the 
individual's endowment the "endowment effect." “(p. 1326)  
The effect is seen as a manifestation of loss aversion even in riskless choice situations, 
meaning that losses are perceived substantially more important than equal gains in the 
evaluation of trades. This implicitly leads to the assumption that the set of mutually 
acceptable trades in a market is reduced, considering that owners would attribute a higher 
dollar value to the good in their possession facing a loss when giving it up, than buyers would 
attribute to a comparable gain by acquiring the same good.  
The theories are backed up by data resulting from a series of experimental tests on the 
endowment effect and the Coase theorem with over 700 participants that will be described in 
more detail hereafter as examples of typical endowment effect experiments.  
 
In a first experiment, 44 advanced undergraduate students at Cornell University were 
asked to participate in a series of 11 consecutive markets. The first three markets were held 
for induced-value tokens. In each market, participants were either owners (= sellers) or non-
owners (= buyers). Sellers were told that they now owned a token with a certain value that 
they could either keep and cash in for the indicated value or consider selling. If they chose to 
sell the token, they were asked to indicate on a list for each value ranging from $ 0,25 to $ 
8,75 in steps of $ 0,50 if they would or would not sell at this price.    
Buyers were asked respectively if they wanted to take the opportunity to buy the token 
and cash it in for an indicated sum of money, and if so at what price they were willing to buy 
it, or if they would rather not buy the token. Subjects alternated between buyer and seller role 
in the three successive markets and were assigned a different individual redemption value in 
each market.    
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 The forms were collected from each participant after each market period, the market 
clearing price and the number of trades were announced immediately for each market. Three 
buyers and three sellers were picked randomly after each market and were paid off according 
to their stated preferences and the market clearing price. Those were the control rounds of the 
experiment, to see if the participants had understood the procedures. Of course the indicated 
reservation price was expected to equal the induced value of the tokens.   
 
Right after the three induced-value markets, half the participants were given a Cornell 
coffee mug which was selling for $ 6 at the local bookstore. After everyone had examined the 
mugs, four markets for mugs were announced, similar to the previous ones with two 
exceptions: only one of the four markets would be selected randomly to be binding and in this 
market all trades would be implemented. The buyer – seller assignment was maintained for all 
four markets, clearing price and number of trades were announced after each market. Once all 
four markets were completed, the trades of the selected market were executed, mugs 
exchanged. This design made sure learning could take place over the consecutive markets 
while each one was still potentially binding.   
 Another four markets followed, using the same procedures as before but trading boxed 
ballpoint pens with a visible price tag of $ 3,98 , given to those participants being the “non-
owners” in the mug markets.  
All participants faced the same incentives in the consumption goods markets as in the 
induced-value token markets. It was in their best interest to answer truthfully and act 
according to their true reservation values. Buyers would purchase at all prices below their 
ascribed value to the good, owners would agree to sell at all prices above the good’s worth to 
them.  
 
The results from the induced-value token markets and the consumption goods markets 
differed remarkably. Since the goods were allocated randomly, and if preference was 
unrelated to allocation, this should imply that about half of the goods were allocated 
improperly and would be traded. And in the induced-value markets, the expected values were 
obtained: the median buying and selling prices were identical and equal to the induced value, 
and the ratio of actual to predicted trade volume (V/V*) was 1, aggregating over the three 
periods.  
On the other hand, the median selling prices in the consumer goods markets were 
more than twice the median buying prices, with a V/V* ratio of only 0,20 for mugs and 0,41 
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 for pens. There was no increase in observed trade volume over successive markets, 
participants did not learn to adopt equal buying and selling prices.  
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (KKT) further observed that both sellers and buyers 
displayed a wide range of values in the markets, not changing much between the first and last 
market, which would allow gains from trade in the absence of an endowment effect. Mugs 
were desirable and even a small commission for trading would not significantly alter the 
results. 
 A second experiment was conducted in nearly the same way with 38 undergraduate 
economic students at Cornell, the only difference being the second consumption good which 
was replaced by a pair of folding binoculars for $ 4.  
In a third and fourth experiment, participants were asked to state their minimum 
selling prices or maximum buying prices rather than checking yes or no on a list of prices as 
in the first two experiments. No monetary pay-offs were made for the induced-value token 
markets. In experiment 3, four markets for pens followed, the first three being non-binding 
and used for practice only. In experiment 4, five markets for mugs were conducted after the 
token markets, one of them being selected at random to be binding. All the other procedures 
remained unchanged.  
 The results for experiments 2-4 all show remarkable similarities to those obtained in 
the first experiment. In the induced-value markets, the index of V/V* was 0.91 summed over 
all four experiments, even though the participants had no experience with the trading rules 
and the monetary incentives were limited or non existent. In contrast, V/V* averaged only 
0,31 in the markets for consumption goods, with median selling prices being more than 
double the corresponding buying prices even though all participants faced monetary 
incentives and already had gained some experience with the market rules from the token 
markets.  
 
The results of those first experiments already acknowledge the existence of an 
endowment effect by eliminating a couple of other possible explanations for the observed 
undertrade of consumer goods. Transaction costs as well as experimental errors like 
misunderstanding the market procedures could not be considered to be a valuable explanation 
since trading procedures were identical for all the markets, yet only the consumer goods 
markets showed low volume of trade. Also there were no learning effects, the discrepant 
evaluations of buyers and sellers remained stable over successive markets.   
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 If the gap between WTA and WTP had been caused by bargaining habits, this would 
have shown for induced-value tokens as well as for consumer goods since subjects faced 
identical incentives in both markets. Nevertheless, another experiment was conducted to 
eliminate this possible interpretation that the gap was caused by habitual strategic behaviour. 
The procedure was similar to the first four experiments but using the Becker-DeGroot-
Marshak procedure for eliciting values, meaning that the price was selected at random.  
Once again, the results showed a significantly large endowment effect: while nearly all 
the expected exchanges were realized in the induced-value token markets (13 of 14 and 16 of 
17), only six exchanges were realized out of the 14,5 that would have been expected if 
entitlements did not influence valuations. The ratio of actual to predicted trade volume (V/V*) 
was equal 0,41, the median selling price was over twice the median buying price.  
 
To create a realistic market setting, participants were not given money to buy either 
tokens or goods but had to bring their own money supply for all experiments. Even though the 
magnitude of the possible resulting income effects can be considered trivial, they were 
considered a possible explanation of the observed undertrading. Therefore two other 
experiments were conducted, designed to eliminate this possibility of income effects or cash 
restraints.  
In experiment 6, 77 participants were randomly assigned to three groups: sellers, 
buyers and choosers. Sellers were given a coffee mug and then asked for a series of prices, if 
they would be willing to trade the mug at that price. Buyers were asked to indicate if they 
wanted to buy a mug at each of the listed prices. Choosers were asked for each possible price, 
if they would rather take a mug or cash. Nearly the same design was used for experiment 7 
with 117 students at the University of British Columbia, only then the price tags were left on 
the mugs. Both results were consistent and showed once more a serious undertrading, with 
only three actual instead of 12,5 expected trades in the first experiment (V/V*= 0,24) and 
only one of nineteen expected trades in the second experiment (V/V*=0,05). The median 
valuations were $7,12 for sellers, $3,12 for choosers and $2,87 for buyers in experiment 6 and 
very similar in experiment 7.  
Since owners and choosers were clearly in the same position as far as gained wealth is 
concerned, it is legitimate to say that the discrepancies in the valuations of the mugs cannot be 
attributed to income effects but rather reflect the sellers’ sense of endowment created by the 
allocation of the mugs that did not occur with/ arise in the choosers.  
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 Something else could be learned from these experiments, given that the endowment 
effect is created by a difference in the individual valuation and preference for either good or 
money. By comparing the buying and selling behaviour to the decisions of the group with the 
choice, the relative weight of reluctance to buy and reluctance to sell as a component of 
undertrading could be determined.  
The results for buyers and choosers were very close, which leads to the assumption 
that the reluctance to pay was very small and not a significant factor, but rather that the 
observed undertrading is mostly due to a reluctance to part with entitlements; the sellers 
showed a considerably higher relative preference for the good than the money. 
 
As a conclusion, KKT deduced that “The undertrading observed in these experiments 
appears to reflect a true difference in preferences between the potential buyers and sellers.” 
(p. 1343) The observed results should not be seen as mistakes but rather establish the 
endowment effect and loss aversion as fundamental characteristics of preference that aren’t 
likely to be eliminated by either experience, training, or market discipline. Consequentially, 
the endowment effect will also exist and subsist in genuine market settings.   
Furthermore, the experiments also proved that the endowment effect could be a quite 
instantaneous phenomenon, since a substantial increase was witnessed in the value that the 
subjects assigned to the trading objects as soon as they were in their possession. This was a 
remarkable new discovery, since previous discussions of the endowment effect had focused 
on goods that had been possessed for a longer time. Apparently the shift of the reference point 
and the consequent value change were not only caused by sentimental attachment and 
improved technology of consumption as was assumed for long-term endowment effects.  
 
5.2 Non-reversible indifference curves  
 
Indifference curves usually indicate the tradeoffs between two goods, but Knetsch 
(1989) argued that if gains and losses are valued differently, then the direction of the trade 
must also be considered in these representations. Using different real exchange experiments 
he showed that the standard representations are no longer valid, that indifference curves have 
a kink in the status quo and are thus no longer reversible.  
 
He conducted three sorts of experiments that nonetheless all led to the same results.  
The first experiment was a preference exercise offering the participants the choice between 
two goods. Respondents were given either a coffee mug or a chocolate bar that they could 
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 trade without uncertainty or effort against the other good if they wanted to. A control group 
was given the choice between the two goods straight away. The results showed that the initial 
endowments and the resulting direction of the trade significantly influenced the valuations of 
the two goods.  
A second experiment compared the exchange between a good and money. Again, the 
results showed a strong bias towards the initial endowment. Thirdly, Knetsch analysed 
general public reactions obtained in a series of telephone surveys, also with similar results.  
The substantial disparities recorded in these three experimental approaches provide 
strong evidence that indifference curves are not completely reversible, but that the preferences 
vary according to the initial reference entitlement. This observation could support the theory 
that losses are valued higher than possible gains.   
 
5.3Theory of substitutes 
 
Michael W. Hanemann (1991) proposed another explanation of the reason behind the 
divergence between WTP and WTA values and of its magnitude.  
After noticing that there was disaccord between the environmental-economics 
literature that predicted relative equivalence of WTP and WTA values for changes in 
environmental amenities unless values were biased by income effects, and empirical evidence 
on the other hand that showed large disparities of the two values, and because he was not 
satisfied with unusual income effects or failures in the survey methodology as an explanation, 
Hanemann re-examined Randall and Stoll’s (1980) work to show that its implications have 
been misunderstood. 
Using the conventional welfare measures for price changes, the compensating and 
equivalent variations, which correspond to WTP and WTA respectively and can also be 
extended to quantity changes, he showed that “the difference between WTP and WTA depends 
not only on an income effect but also on a substitution effect.” (p. 635) He defined this effect 
as “the ease with which other privately marketed commodities can be substituted for the given 
public good or fixed commodity, while maintaining the individual at a constant level of 
utility.” (p. 635) By analyzing the two polar cases of either perfect or zero substitution, he 
demonstrated that if a good has a number of readily available substitutes, than the values of 
WTA and WTP are close to equal. On the other hand, if an item has only imperfect or no 
substitutes at all, like personal health, then the values for WTA can be infinite. So the fewer 
substitutes are available for a good, the greater the gap between WTP and WTA is to be 
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 expected. He further suggested that “the substitution effects could exert a far greater leverage 
on the relation between WTP and WTA than the income effects.” (p. 646) 
 
Shogren, Shin, Hayes, and Kliebenstein (1994) supported Hanemann’s proposition 
after testing it in a nonhypothetical auction market.  
An experiment in two stages was designed to elicit participants’ WTP or WTA values 
both for a market good with almost perfect substitution, a candy bar, and for a nonmarket 
good with no substitution, personal health risk, using Vickrey auctions with trial rounds and 
small initial income. First, participants received a small piece of candy that could be upgraded 
to a regular-size brand-name candy bar. In the second stage, they were given a free lunch 
purchased from a local store that had a typical chance to cause food-borne illness that they 
either had to eat or could upgrade to food that had been stringently screened for food-borne 
pathogens, thus evaluating the values for reduced health risk.   
The results showed that: “For the market good with close substitutes, WTP and WTA 
measures of value are not statistically different with repeated market exposure. In contrast, 
for the nonmarket good with imperfect substitutes, WTP and WTA measures are significantly 
different, even after repeated market participation and with full information about the 
probability and severity of the health risk.” (p. 264)  
As an alternative to Hanemann’s theory of a substitution effect, Shogren at al. also 
conducted another experiment on the endowment effect as described by Kahneman et al. 
(1990) to study the relation between these two effects and to see if the inability to substitute 
goods might even be an underlying motivation to explain the latter.     
The additional experiment was designed similar to the previous one, exchanging only 
the candy for a plain plastic mug that could be upgraded to an ISU coffee mug. Yet the results 
do not show an endowment effect, in neither of the two experiments, what among other things 
may be due to the differences in the experimental designs.  
 
5.4 Intrinsic values   
 
Boyce, Brown, McClelland, Peterson, and Schulze (1992) noticed that while WTA 
exceeded WTP by about a factor of 2 in most experiments with consumer goods, field studies 
of environmental goods produced a gap sometimes five times as big. They wondered what the 
source of this difference in magnitude of loss aversion for different commodities could be and 
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 suggested as a possible explanation the theory that the valuation of environmental goods is 
influenced by intrinsic values.  
Moral motives may lead individuals to want to preserve natural resources even without 
hope of recompense. Thus, kinked indifference curves can occur, if along with the attribution 
of property rights goes the assignment of moral responsibility; intrinsic values would mostly 
be included in WTA measures but not in WTP measures. Attributes that have been connected 
with intrinsic values are for example irreversibility, uniqueness, a sense of moral obligation 
and sentimentality.  
In their study, Boyce et al. chose a Norfolk Island pine tree to test this theory by 
comparing the results from a typical experiment to elicit WTA and WTP measures to the 
values obtained from a second scenario where participants knew the tree would be destroyed 
if they sold it back to the experimenter/ failed to buy it. The results show a ration of WTA to 
WTP values of about 1,7 for the standard experiment, while the ratio is about 2,4 for the 
experiment where trees were effectively destroyed.  
Thus Boyce et al. concluded that “the disparity between WTA and WTP for 
environmental goods may in great part be due to the intrinsic "moral" values captured by 
such commodities” (p. 1371) and that “the framing effect caused by a difference in implicit 
property rights when shifting from WTP to WTA may contribute to the disparity between these 
measures.” (p. 1371) 
 
5.5 Imprecise preferences  
 
Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and Loomes (1994) suggested that the imprecision of people’s 
preferences also contributes to the magnitude of the disparity between WTA and WTP. In 
their study, they elicited participants WTP and WTA values for changes in the risk of road 
injuries to see if people maybe have imprecise preferences over combinations of wealth, risk 
and safety that lead to a gap between WTP and WTA.  
In personal interviews participants were asked how much they would be willing to pay 
for a safety feature for their car that would reduce their own risk of different types of road 
injuries by half. Responses were collected in intervals between the largest monetary amount 
they definitely would, and the smallest amount they definitely would not pay, including a best 
estimate. Subsequently the interviewers inquired two WTA values if the participants had the 
possibility to buy a new car without a standard safety feature that would increase their risk of 
a road injury, again in intervals.  
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 The results show not only a significant gap between participants WTP and WTA, but 
also support the assumption that those preferences are in fact imprecise. Participants could not 
easily decide within the intervals if they would pay or accept compensation for changes in the 
risk of injuries or not. Further, they found that respondents when facing such uncertainty 
became increasingly cautious. Yet they acknowledge that imprecise preferences alone are not 
enough to account for more than part of the disparity between willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept measures of value.  
 
5.6 Asymmetric information  
 
Dupont and Lee (2002) proposed yet another explanation for the discrepancy between 
WTA and WTP. They showed that “a framework where rational agents face asymmetric 
information can also explain the wedge between ask and bid prices without invoking 
psychology.” (p.88) If two agents trade an item, and at least one of them is uninformed and 
has reservations about the true risks of the trade, then this will reflect in his offers, causing a 
gap between WTA and WTP values even without endowment effect.  
 
5.7 Uncertainty 
 
Inder and O’Brien (2003) argued that since many decisions comprise an element of 
uncertainty and because this uncertainty causes negative psychological reactions in most 
people, it can thus influence the valuations of their decisions to buy or sell goods, 
encouraging them to remain with the status quo, thus leading to the endowment effect. 
According to them, loss aversion alone cannot explain the wide range of results obtained in 
experiments when eliciting WTP and WTA values, and neither does it explain the 
convergence of the values with repeated market trials, whereas variations in the degree of 
uncertainty faced by the participants can, because both buyer and seller can acquire additional 
information with each trial.  
While loss aversion is usually attributed to sellers’ behaviour, Inder and O’Brien focus 
on the buyers’ role mostly. They demonstrated that a buyer will only accept a selling price if 
his psychological reactions to buying and selling are zero, elsewise there will be an 
observable endowment effect. Further they argue that the influence of uncertainty on 
decisions also explains why the ratio of WTA and WTP can vary considerably for different 
goods, depending on how common the traded items are. 
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 5.8 Information processing 
 
Nayakankuppam and Mishra (2005) argued that differing reservation prices are caused 
by differences in information processing, sellers and buyers perceiving the traded item 
fundamentally differently. While sellers would rather focus on the positive features, buyers 
would put more importance on the negative features of the good. Thus the endowment effect 
would reflect biased information integration.  
They supported their theory with data from three different experiments, showing also 
that if the traders’ foci are manipulated, the endowment effect can be moderated.  
 
5.9 Ownership 
 
Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, and Wilson (2009) contrasted two different explanations for 
the endowment effect. For one thing, the idea of loss aversion, where giving up a good is 
perceived more painful than acquiring it would be pleasurable. On the other hand, the theory 
that people might want to hold on to a good because they own it and have come to associate 
the good with themselves. They opposed these theories one to the other in two experiments, 
both trading coffee mugs using a Becker- DeGroot-Marschak procedure.  
 
In the first experiment, subjects were assigned to one of four groups: they were either 
typical sellers or buyers as seen in other standard endowment effect studies, or they were 
assigned the roles of buyers who already owned a mug and therefore acquired a second one, 
or pair-buyers who could choose to receive two mugs at a time.  
The results produced a typical endowment effect for the standard conditions, but 
further showed that buyers who already owned a mug were valuing a second mug higher than 
ordinary buyers their first mug, and as much as sellers valued the mug they owned. All 
owners thus valued the mugs equally and there was no more endowment effect between 
sellers and owner-buyers. Also, it can be said that complementarity did not bias the valuations 
of the owner-buyers, since pair-buyers had the same per-unit valuation of mugs as ordinary 
buyers.    
In a second experiment, participants were first randomly divided into owners or non-
owners of a mug. Then they were randomly assigned the roles of buyer’s agents or seller’s 
agents, allowing them to undergo a typical endowment effect experiment but making the 
decisions on behalf of a future participant. The results are once more in favour of the 
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 ownership theory, because participants owning a mug themselves also valued the other 
person’s mug more, regardless of whether they were buyers’ or sellers’ agents.  
In summary, for both experiments ownership has proven to be the driving force behind 
the endowment effect while loss aversion has not.  
 
5.10 Subject misconceptions  
 
Plott and Zeiler (2005) took the fact that there was no consensus in the literature as to 
the nature of the gap between willingness to pay and willingness to accept values as a 
motivation to examine more closely the influence of the experimental designs and more 
specifically the relevance of subject misconceptions, suggesting a misinterpretation of 
previous experimental results.  
Since the notion of “misconceptions” has been neither quantified nor operationalized, 
even though all experimenters try to avoid them, Plott and Zeiler argue that the best way to 
approach the matter is to simultaneously control for all possible sources of misconceptions at 
once to reliably eliminate them. Yet they noticed that not one experiment reported in the 
literature had previously done this.  
In their own study, they first successfully replicated one of Kahnemann, Knetsch, and 
Thaler’s (1990) experiments to see if they too could reproduce the gap between WTA and 
WTP measures. In a second step they designed their own experiment in which they tried to 
completely control for subject misconceptions to determine if the procedures themselves were 
responsible for the discrepancies. In this case, the gap between WTA and WTP values would 
not be related to the nature of preferences.  
They tried to come by the shortcomings of previous studies by adapting the standard 
experiment according to their own conception, using a really incentive-compatible elicitation 
method (modified BDM procedure) and providing participants with detailed explanations of 
the valuation mechanism, paid practice rounds, extensive training and anonymity all at once.  
Under these circumstances their results did not show a gap between WTA and WTP. 
Plott and Zeiler therefore concluded that since the discrepancy between WTA and WTP can 
be turned on and off by using different experimental procedures it does not “reflect a 
fundamental feature of human preferences.” (p. 542) 
However, they also encouraged discussion of their results, admitting their theory was 
far from thoroughly elaborate. As only one example they offered the interpretation that the 
procedures themselves might have discouraged differences between WTA and WTP by 
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 assigning the participants both buying and selling roles during the lottery training rounds. 
This could then have led to a transference from subjects’ attitudes towards lotteries onto the 
actual object of interest, the mug, having neither ownership nor loss take a major part in the 
formation of preferences. Another possible shortcoming of their procedure could be that by 
giving too many explanations and guided training rounds, they could have influenced the 
responses of the participants away from their true reservation prices towards stated values that 
would be more likely to result in a trade.  
 
II. Factors influencing the Endowment Effect 
 
In their article from 1990, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler already identified some 
conditions they believed necessary for the endowment effect to be observed. Since then, 
numerous articles have been published further eliciting factors influencing the presence or the 
magnitude of the endowment effect, some of which will be discussed hereafter.  
For an easier overview, these factors can be grouped roughly into three categories: the 
features of the traded good or service, the characteristics of the bargaining agents and the 
properties of the market settings.  
 
1. Product characteristics  
 
As seen in Part I, loss aversion and the endowment effect have been demonstrated for 
a variety of goods. Even though these objects were mostly low-price consumer goods such as 
mugs, pens and binoculars given their applicability in laboratory experiments, there is no 
reason to believe that the endowment effect would not also occur considering more valuable 
goods. Likewise, the early research on willingness to pay and willingness to accept has shown 
that the disparity between these values can also be measured for public goods or services.      
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) even proposed that “Endowment effects are 
not limited to cases involving physical goods or to legal entitlements” (p. 1345) but can also 
occur during negotiations about terms of previous transactions and arrangements. Loss 
aversion could manifest itself in an unwillingness to make concessions on a dimension of an 
agreement if it is conflicting with the reference position.  
 On the other hand, there are scenarios in which the endowment effect is very unlikely 
to occur, like markets for induced-value money tokens, where the tokens are valued only 
because they can be converted into cash. In the same spirit, no loss aversion is expected for 
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 goods that have been purchased for resale only, especially not if a perfect substitute was 
available at a lower price. See part II.1.3 for more elaborations about exchange goods.   
 There are many more factors to be considered about the features of a traded good that 
can influence the endowment effect; a selection of articles shall be discussed below.  
 
 1.1 Source dependence  
 
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) showed in two experiments that people value their 
possessions differently depending on how they got endowed with them.  
Participants who believed they had received a mug by chance valued it significantly 
less than those who believed they had received the mug as a result of their good performance 
on an exercise. Also, participants who gained a mug due to their good performance at a task 
valued it higher than participants who got the mug as a consolation price for their poor 
performance at the task.  
Further, their results showed that source dependence effects can be either positive or 
negative, but that “source dependence has a greater effect on the valuation of objects that one 
obtains than of objects that one fails to obtain.” (p. 163)  
 
On a quantitative note, Loewenstein and Issacharoff found that “this ‘source 
dependence’ effect is approximately equal in strength to the endowment effect” (p. 157) in 
both their experiments to the point of the two effects neutralizing each other when operating 
in opposition, but conceded that this could be coincidental.  
 
  1.2 Ownership history 
 
Not only does current ownership instantly affect object valuation, but Strahilevitz and 
Loewenstein (1998) demonstrated that the ownership history also has an influence on the 
endowment effect.  
Previous research had established that the endowment effect begins instantly when 
people are given an object, but since the instant endowment effect is subject to changes in 
strength according to objects (Sayman 1996), studying the development of loss aversion 
under other influential factors like time seemed also promising.   
Based on the concept of shifting reference points as a basis of loss aversion, combined 
with the fact that people eventually adapt to both positive and negative changes in their 
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 material situation, but that this adaptation is gradual rather than instant, Strahilevitz and 
Loewenstein developed the hypotheses that the longer a person holds possession of an object, 
the higher the valuation of this object will be, just as the buy-back price of an object will be 
higher the longer the object had been owned, but decreasing over the time that has elapsed 
since the loss.  
In a series of four experiments where the time of ownership of small goods like mugs 
and key chains was manipulated across participants before eliciting their WTA and WTP 
values, they found that past and present ownership have an effect on object valuation.  
“For objects currently in one's possession, we find that valuation increases with 
duration of ownership. For objects not in one's possession, previous ownership experience 
increases valuation, and the increase appears to be related to the duration of ownership 
before loss. In addition, the perceived attractiveness of objects, although not instantly affected 
by endowment, is found to increase with duration of ownership.” (p. 276)  
The decrease in valuation related to the time that has passed since the loss of an object 
could not be supported, but this might have been due to the limitations of the experimental 
settings and remains subject to further research.  
 
 1.3 Exchange goods   
 
Van Dijk and Van Knippenberg (1996) examined possible circumstances under which 
loss aversion can occur for exchange goods. Contrary to previous research, they showed that 
the endowment effect can be observed if the future exchange rates are uncertain.  
As stated by Kahneman (1992), loss aversion should not affect transactions of goods 
that were held for exchange only, and even less so if the transactions are part of an economic 
routine. The value of these goods is often given by the amount of money they realize during 
the sale, so traders should not think in terms of gaining or losing a good, but focus on the net 
gains and losses that result from the exchange. This was often tested in experiments, typically 
using money tokens for simplicity.  
 However in cases of uncertain future exchange values, net gains are no longer 
computable and may lead to loss aversion.  
Results obtained from an experimental market that included buying and selling of 
bargaining chips with a fixed value as well as tokens with an uncertain value confirmed that 
“exchange goods may, like consumption goods, be susceptible to the endowment effect, 
provided that exchange rates are uncertain.” (p. 521)  
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  Further the answers from participants in the exchange under uncertainty condition 
revealed that, when asked to estimate the monetary value of the tokens, buyers and sellers did 
not expect significantly different values. Thus uncertainty about exchange rates did not 
influence value estimates, only trading prices.    
  
Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and van Dijk (2005) suggested that curiosity might be an 
additional variable that contributes to the endowment effect of exchange goods with uncertain 
value.   
They argued that by selling an exchange good with an uncertain value, owners not 
only lose the good but also the possibility to know about its future value. This inability to 
satisfy their curiosity is supposed to be more pronounced for sellers than for buyers because 
the later don’t lose the chance for information but simply don’t acquire it. The endowment 
effect would thus be reinforced by a double loss aversion on the seller’s side.   
The hypothesis was verified in an experimental scenario that elicited minimum selling 
and buying prices in different scenarios: The value of the exchange good was either fixed or 
uncertain, and the information about the eventual value of the good was either given to all 
participants or to final owners only.   
The results confirmed the hypothesis by showing an endowment effect in both 
scenarios with uncertain value. Also the manipulation of final information led to significantly 
different WTA values: if the eventual value was available to everyone, sellers were inclined to 
lower their demands towards the prices asked from sellers in the scenarios with fixed 
exchange value. Also buyers were not affected significantly by the manipulation of 
information availability.  
 
Even if curiosity is only one of many factors leading to the endowment effect and was 
found in their paper primarily in owners of exchange goods with uncertain value, Van de Ven 
et al. raised the question if the curiosity effect may not be relevant for all goods that include 
an element of uncertainty. Also, the results suggest that other useful insights may be found on 
the endowment effect by studying the behaviour of non-owners.     
 
1.4 Time 
 
Hoorens, Remmers, Van de Riet (1999) showed that the good does not need to be a 
physical one, but that people also value the time they spend for doing chores more highly than 
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 the time someone else spends for doing the same things. ”Subjects indicated both higher fair 
wages for oneself than for another person (…) and higher fair wages for selling time than for 
buying time.” (p. 383)  
 
 1.5 Information  
 
Raban and Rafaeli (2003) ran an experiment in which participants could buy or sell 
information.  They found that “people value information they own much more than 
information they do not own” (p.119), with an endowment effect comparable in magnitude to 
the one found for market goods, but attribute the disparity to risk aversion rather than to loss 
aversion.  
 
 1.6 Money  
 
Bateman, Kahneman, Munro, Starmer, and Sugden (2002) argued that spending 
money could be seen as some kind of loss, therefore it should be possible that there also is 
loss aversion for money. To try to measure the extend of it they designed an experiment 
eliciting not only the usual valuations of an item in amounts of money, but also the valuations 
of money in units of a good.  
The results are not as conclusive as they had hoped for. Even though an endowment 
effect is generally found, it is weaker than usual and the hypotheses are not rejected but not 
supported at a statistically significant level either. So the idea that an endowment effect can 
exist even for money is conceivable but there certainly remains need of future research.  
 
2. Transaction participants  
 
Another important aspect when talking about the endowment effect is to analyze the 
agents involved in the transactions and what influences might motivate them to act the way 
they do.  
KKT noted that the endowment effect seems to be primarily a problem for sellers, 
since they observed a lot of reluctance to sell but little reluctance to buy in their experiments. 
Yet not all sellers seemed affected, just as not all sellers are necessarily individuals. 
Endowment effects can for example also be observed for firms and other organizations and 
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 are also discernable in team negotiations. A selection of articles concerned about the 
important differences of transaction participants will be reported below.   
 
 2.1 Socio-economic factors  
 
Gächter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007) did a series of experiments with over 600 
customers of a car manufacturer on individual-level loss aversion.  
In a first step, they compared measures of loss aversion from the same individuals in a 
riskless and a risky choice task to see if people were equally loss averse in both conditions. 
The results showed that the values were positively correlated, participants exhibiting loss 
aversion under one condition were much more likely to show it in the other situation too.   
 
Further, their experimental design allowed to elicit both WTA and WTP values from 
the same individuals, which showed a remarkable “degree of individual heterogeneity in loss 
aversion.”(p. 2) Even though the average valuations for WTA/WTP are not significantly 
different in the within-subject study and in a between-subject study that serves as a control 
benchmark, there is a “substantial heterogeneity in riskless individual-level loss aversion”. 
“For 78 percent of individuals it holds that 1 < WTA/WTP ≤ 4. Ten percent of individuals 
have a ratio above 4 and for the rest the ratio is at most 1.”(both p. 4)  
 
Finally, the paper showed that socio-demographic variables have an influence on 
individual loss aversion. The pool of participants was not restricted to students as in most 
other experiments but comprised a wider spectrum of different variables, even though it was 
not representative for the whole population. Still Gächter et al. were able to discern six 
economically interesting factors and their impact on loss aversion: gender, age, income, 
wealth, education and occupation. The results were similar for loss aversion in riskless and 
risky choice tasks: “We find no gender effect. Loss aversion increases in age. Higher 
education decreases loss aversion. Household income and wealth are positively correlated 
with loss aversion.“ (p. 16) This is an interesting outcome since education and income are 
usually positively correlated, and although it seems imaginable that they influence loss 
aversion in opposite directions, a more thorough analysis could be worthwhile.  
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  2.2 Personal experience  
 
Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund (2001) argued that most experiments designed to 
examine how the endowment effect changes with experience only examined respondents’ 
adjustments to experimental mechanisms by repetition instead of the effects of real experience 
with actual market transactions on the endowment effect. According to them, if the 
endowment effect was a manifestation of a mistake due to peoples’ inexperience with market 
situations, then the endowment effect should decrease as individuals gain experience with 
trade, that is to say decrease with age. On the other hand, if the endowment effect was 
explained by reference-dependent preferences, then it would persist even with accumulated 
general market experience.        
To test their theory, they conducted a series of simple experiments where children 
from kindergarten, third-grade, fifth-grade and undergraduates were endowed with a good 
they could keep or trade for a different item.  
The results show that the initial endowment has an effect on the good the respondents 
choose. Further, the behaviour across age groups is not significantly different, all ages are 
equally susceptible to the endowment effect and there is no evidence that the endowment 
effect decreases with age or general market experience, thus the theory of a manifestation of a 
mistake is not supported. This seems compatible with the findings of Gächter et al. (2007) 
even though the results did not show a significant positive influence of age on the endowment 
effect, what could be due to the fact that the latter had considerably more participants with a 
substantially higher age difference.   
 
2.3 Market experience  
 
List (2003) also examined the influence of experience on the endowment effect, 
however not the general market experience people gather with age but rather the experience 
related to trading frequency in a specific market.  
To this purpose he compared responses to a simple choice experiment between two 
goods from dealers and consumers at a sports memorabilia trading event. Dealers have intense 
trading frequency in the market, whereas consumers usually trade less often and are rather 
inexperienced. 
The results showed that dealers behaviour converged towards the neoclassical 
prediction of half the items being traded, revealing no significant endowment effect, whereas 
consumers’ preferences were biased by initial endowment. Moreover, when dividing the 
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 consumers further into an experienced and an inexperienced group according to their trading 
frequency, the endowment effect for experienced non-dealers was much smaller and not 
significant.  
List also replicated these results in another market and thus showed that the trading 
frequency can extenuate the endowment effect.  
 
 2.4 Transaction demand  
 
Mandel (2002) analyzed if the discrepancy between buying and selling prices could be 
linked to motivational factors, more specifically to transaction demand, the motivation to 
complete a transaction.  
In a first experiment he manipulated the levels of transaction demand, asking 
participants to imagine themselves in different scenarios with varying levels of transaction 
demand for buyer and seller , to see if the magnitude of the endowment effect would be 
affected by the participant’s inclination to buy or sell. When their own transaction demand is 
high, sellers should be willing to decrease, buyer to increase their offers to the point of 
reducing and possibly even reversing the endowment effect. The results supported this theory, 
showing that transaction demand works as a moderator of the endowment effect.  
In a second experiment, Mandel tested the effect of inferred transaction demand on 
buying and selling prices. The hypothesis was that if individuals believed the transaction 
demand of their trading partners to be high, than they would be likely to increase selling 
prices and decrease buying prices, thus amplifying the endowment effect. This theory was not 
supported by the results. 
Still the experiments showed the importance of motivational factors among other 
factors to elucidate the endowment effect. They could even help explain the fact that loss 
aversion is not found for exchange goods: they are per definition meant to be sold, so 
transaction demand is relatively high compared to goods held for use where transaction 
demand is low.  
  
 2.5 Individual vs. team negotiations  
 
Galin, Gross, Kella-Egozy, and Sapir (2006) examined the varying impact of 
judgement biases such as the endowment effect on negotiating teams.  
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 Since the existing literature about group decisions was at odds whether group 
judgments reduced, enhanced or did not affect the endowment effect at all, Galin et al. 
conducted their own study on the matter. They compared the results from negotiations 
between university authorities and students, either individually or as groups. Negotiations 
were held about the combination of courses students needed to complete to achieve their 
academic degree. The current curriculum with its combination of advanced courses and more 
challenging seminars was considered the status quo, adding another seminar would imply a 
decrease in leisure time and an increase in intellectual effort, a relative loss for the students 
that could be compensated by a negotiable number of advanced courses students could drop 
instead and vice-versa. So the central goods were the intangible items time and intellectual 
effort, while the procedure of the experiment elicited possible differences between individual 
and group decisions, comparing the answers from 153 individual students to those collected 
from 31 groups of three students each.  
 The results showed that there is a gap between WTA and WTP even when trading 
intangible objects, and that “the intensity of the Endowment Effect in groups in comparison to 
individuals is much higher”. (p. 9) 
These findings suggest that it might be more efficient, especially on a practical 
business level, not to negotiate in groups because teams are not more rational decision makers 
but rather amplify individual judgment biases.   
 
3. Market settings 
 
 3.1 Situational influences 
 
Franciosi, Kujal, Michelitsch, Smith, and Deng (1996) examined the influence that the 
wording of experimental designs can have on the results of endowment effect experiments. 
They argued that the use of emotive terms such as “buying”, “selling” or “choosing” could 
trigger psychological effects and induce strategic considerations.    
They replicated some of KKT’s experiments with small changes in the experimental 
design that eliminated all references to buying or selling and presented a mere choice task 
instead, thus neutralizing the psychological aspects.  
Their results showed that the discrepancy between WTA and WTP can be decidedly 
lowered but nevertheless remains significant and still results in undertrading.  
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  3.2 Emotional influences  
 
Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) tested how specific emotions carried over from 
prior situations can affect the endowment effect.  
They had noticed a lack of studies concerned with the impact of carryover effects of 
emotions on behaviour with financial consequences. In their study, they combined a 
manipulation of different emotions (neutral, disgust, sadness) with an ownership manipulation 
(sell and choice) to see if emotions triggered in the first stage of the experiment would 
influence valuations in the second.  
Participants were seated in front of computers in private cubicles and some were given 
a highlighter set as trading goods. After watching one of three films that were chosen to make 
the participants feel either sad, disgusted or just neutral, buying or selling prices for the 
trading good were elicited. Also, the accuracy of the emotion-induction effects was controlled 
by an emotion-manipulation check.  
The results showed that “disgust induced by a prior, irrelevant situation carried over 
to normatively unrelated economic decisions, reducing selling and choice prices and 
eliminating the endowment effect. Sadness also carried over, reducing selling prices but 
increasing choice prices - producing a ‘‘reverse endowment effect’’ in which choice prices 
exceeded selling prices.” (p. 337) 
This shows that emotions can strongly influence trading even if they are not directly 
related to the transaction.  
  
  3.3 Influences of property rights  
 
Heyman, Orhun, and Ariely (2004) examined consumer behaviour in online auctions. 
Even though second-price auctions are supposed to encourage bidders to state their true 
valuations of the traded objects, sniping and repeated bidding can often be observed to lead to 
over-bidding. In their work, Heyman et al. identified two factors that can explain such 
behaviour, namely a quasi-endowment and an opponent effect.  
The opponent effect results from the fact that auctions are perceived as competitive, 
the final price of an auctioned good is positively related to the number of bids and bidders and 
reflects a certain satisfaction of winning by outbidding the other participants. On the other 
hand, “quasi-endowment is a sense of ownership that bidders develop during an auction, even 
though they are not the owners in any common or reasonable sense of the word.” (p. 9) 
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 Previous studies focussing on the relation between ownership and valuation of an 
object had known only three conditions: current ownership, past ownership or none at all. 
Since according to the idea of loss aversion, not acquiring a good is less painful that giving 
one up, because individuals develop some sort of attachment to goods in their possession, the 
allocation of the perceived rights of a good seems important. Whereas in all previous 
experimental studies the physical or legal possession of the traded good was unambiguous, 
online auctions abide by different rules.   
  Heyman et al. argued that high bidders might feel like they were already owners 
during the time when they lead an auction, thus already starting to adjust their reference point 
and changing their valuation of the object before even having any rights to the good. They 
“call this attachment to an un-owned item the “quasi-endowment” effect“. (p. 10) 
 
In two studies, a survey-based experiment and a real-money laboratory auction, they 
could verify the existence of both effects. Furthermore, the results suggested that the two 
factors were additive and together made bidders change their valuations of a good in the 
course of its auction.  
Thus, Heyman, Orhun, and Ariely demonstrated that at least in an auction scenario, 
perceived competition increased the endowment effect and actual possession was not even 
necessary to influence people’s valuations of a good and to cause loss aversion.  
  
 3.4 Competition 
 
Shahrabani, Benzion, and Shavit (2008) wondered about the influence of competition 
on the values of WTA and WTP for different types of goods. They compared values obtained 
in a second-price auction scenario and a BDM procedure for physical goods and lotteries.  
Even though the mechanisms should be theoretically equivalent, the empirically obtained 
values diverged.  
In a BDM procedure, there is no competition among the participants, whereas in a 
second-price auction, the bidders compete against each other, and often derive utility from 
winning. Shahrabani, Benzion, and Shavit analyzed several psychological effects like regret, 
disappointment, ownership or asymmetry, their possible interaction with a competitive 
environment and their influence on individuals’ bidding patterns according to procedure and 
traded good.  
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 Their results showed that WTP was significantly higher, WTA significantly lower 
when using a competitive elicitation method for assets that were not highly risky. Likewise 
the values for the WTA-WTP gap differed “as a result of the interaction between the 
competitiveness effect and other psychological effects on bidding patterns”. (p. 153)  
Thus competition had an influence on the valuation of goods, even though the 
magnitude of the effect depended on the product type and various other factors.  
 
III. Psychological aspects 
 
1. Empathy and misperception 
 
 Successful social interaction is based on accurate perspective taking, which is not easy 
and if failed can lead to misunderstandings and conflicts. Van Boven, Dunning, and 
Loewenstein (2000) explored this ability in an important everyday interaction. In five studies 
they examined the level of empathy between owners and buyers, the accuracy of their 
perspective taking and their perceptions of the endowment effect.   
 In the first two experiments that were based on the classical design by Kahnemann, 
Knetsch, and Thaler, buyers were additionally asked to estimate the reservation price of the 
sellers and vice versa.  
The results showed the expected endowment effect but also demonstrated that owners 
and buyers are heavily biased by their subjective experience. They were unable to correctly 
envisage the responses of participants in the other role, overestimating the similarity between 
their own and the others’ valuations of a good: buyers underestimated the owners’ selling 
prices and owners overestimated the buyers’ reservation prices. There was no difference 
whether the participants had learned about the endowment effect or not, neither did a lack of 
motivation or the order of the statements have any influence.  
 
 In a real market setting, an unbiased perception of the endowment effect and the 
accurate assessment of other peoples’ valuations of a good can be crucial to making a profit, 
which is especially important for agents. So the next experiment was designed to investigate 
if this failure to estimate the correct valuations will lead to costly behaviour.  
Participants were divided into mug owners and buyers’ agents. The later were given a 
$10 budget to make an offer for a mug, and if the price was acceptable to an owner, buy the 
mug and keep whatever was left as their profit.  
33
 
 The hypothesis was that since agents are not owners themselves, they would fail to 
estimate the owners’ true value of the mug, thus making poor offers that would be rejected. 
The results confirmed this hypothesis; the agents were not very successful as only 19% of 
their offers were accepted, the rest was too low. This demonstrated that egocentric empathy 
gaps can lead to costly decisions.  
 
Having shown that people cannot accurately estimate how valuable a good is for 
someone else, and that this neglect of the endowment effect can lead to unprofitable 
behaviour, the next questions addressed by the last two experiments of the article were 
whether people would at least draw the right conclusions after they were informed about the 
real valuations of the other party, how the empathy gaps could be at least partially explained 
and if the ability to empathize could be manipulated.  
Learning from mistakes is important to enhance economic performance, but can only 
take place if the right conclusions are drawn after a failed transaction. So resolving the 
question what participants would consider to be the underlying cause of the transaction failure 
is essential to see if correct learning can be achieved.     
By asking participants who failed to complete a transaction to rate the likeliness of 
several possible explanations, Van Boven et al. discovered that people blamed personal 
dispositions like greed for the disparity between WTA and WTP rather than identifying the 
endowment effect. This means the failure to empathize with someone else’s subjective 
experience leads not only to unwise decisions but also to misinterpretations and wrong 
learning.  
 
As to the question how the empathy gaps could be explained, Van Boven et al. found 
that an underlying reason was that people could not even imagine how much they would 
value the good themselves if they were in the other role.   
By giving half the buyers’ agents their own mug and thus letting them experience 
ownership, their ability to anticipate owners’ behaviour was increased significantly, their 
estimation of the owners’ selling prices much more accurate and the empathy gaps reduced 
considerably.  
Thus people’s inaptitude to estimate the behaviour of their trading partner is a result 
from their incapacity to introspect their own behaviour should they be in the other position.  
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 2. Misprediction  
 
 Based on the theory of non-reversible indifference curves, Loewenstein and Adler 
(1995) considered the endowment effect as a type of endogenous taste-change and 
investigated whether people were able to accurately predict this change in their own tastes. 
They argued that economic agents should be able to “predict without bias the effect of their 
current behaviour on their own future tastes” (p. 929) but worried that the endowment effect 
could lead them to make systematical mispredictions.  
In their experiment they asked participants to predict their reservation price for an 
object they did not yet own and compared the values to actual selling prices. The results 
showed that even if prior desire to possess the good was low, people became attached to it 
with ownership without being aware of this development. So participants were unaware how 
much their own tastes would be influenced by the endowment effect and could not accurately 
predict its’ impact.  
This means people cannot predict the impact of the endowment effect because they 
cannot predict their own tastes in the future.  
  
IV. Application 
 
Endowment effect and loss aversion are robust, important phenomena that occur in 
everyday market situations and should therefore be considered, not least because of their 
shear magnitude.  
As the articles discussed above have shown, people do not always have a clear 
perception of their own or someone else’s endowment effect and they cannot predict that they 
will become attached to something they own in the future since they generally don’t know 
what they want before they have it. This makes a practical application of the endowment 
effect the perfect tool to be used in marketing, even more so since there are a lot of ways to 
manipulate loss aversion and it can be applied for almost anything that can be owned.  
While companies can use knowledge about the endowment effect to design marketing 
strategies to maximize their sales, consumers can also benefit from awareness and 
understanding of the phenomenon in order to identify possible manipulations and to optimize 
their market behaviour, for instance when facing an auction. Agents finally need to consider 
the gap between valuations as a possible cause of disagreement between buyers and sellers 
35
 
 they need to overcome, and will be well advised to try hard to keep the endowment effect in 
mind when handling offers in order to maximize their profits.  
Some ideas how to translate and use the knowledge about the endowment effect 
profitably shall be discussed below.  
 
1. Test-ownership 
 
A good way for a company to increase the consumers’ willingness to pay is to give 
them one of the products for trial use. This way, the potential buyer has not only the 
possibility to see for himself all the advantages of the product, but can already make 
experiences with the product and develop a sense of ownership, adjust the status quo and 
become averse to the idea of losing the commodity again. Of course such a marketing strategy 
can only apply for high-priced consumer goods, that allow sellers to keep track with their 
possessions easily and that can generate a certain profit worth the effort.  
Also this chance to use the product before buying it can be especially worthwhile for 
products that require a collective decision of more than one group member, a whole family 
deciding to buy a new car for example. When they are given a nice replacement vehicle 
during their own car’s repair, this gives every family member a chance to enjoy the feeling of 
almost owning it, so as a function the willingness to spend more money on the next car the 
family buys will probably increase.   
Another common example these days is to award the use of a motor-vehicle for a 
weekend as the price of a lottery. Even though the time of the ownership-like state is limited, 
the disposition to buy the good at a later time will increase.  
  
2. Default option 
  
The selection of a product is affected by the status quo bias, and the default option is 
the equivalent of the reference point. It is more often chosen than not, even if it does not fit 
the consumers wants or needs best, because all derivations from the status quo involve effort 
and because especially when downsizing an offer, this elimination of unwanted features is 
still seen as a loss and therefore avoided. This phenomenon has been shown for a wide range 
of products, from expensive ones such as cars or insurances to non-durable goods like food. 
 Therefore any company needs to be considerate when fixing the default features of a 
product and the strategy to market add-ons, while consumers who are aware of the 
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 endowment effect could be able to make more rational choices when pondering what they 
really want instead of just opting for default options.  
 
3. Time span 
 
Another aspect of the endowment effect to be kept in mind is that it occurs instantly 
once the good is owned, and does not weaken over time. And since consumers cannot 
anticipate that they will get attached to a good simply by owning it, offering products with  
generous rights to exchange and an extended time frame for cash-back options is a way of 
facilitating the purchase that is unlikely to be exploited once the product is part of the 
endowment.  
 
4. Source dependence 
 
Since Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) have shown that the source of the 
endowment has an influence on the valuation of a product, manipulating the origin of the 
endowment can be profitable. Consumers could be more willing to buy a product if they have 
the impression that they gained the chance to buy an otherwise rare good, or that they won 
some part of it, or that they had taken part in a competition even if it is a fake one. Also 
inviting consumers to forward a second item to their friends, and thus creating a chain of 
purchase could be a way to use source dependence by arguing that people would value a 
product more if it was a gift.   
 
5. Emotion 
 
Designing the point of sales in a way that puts costumers in an emotional state that is 
favourable to a purchase is not a new marketing idea but has on the contrary evolved into an 
art of its own by now. The knowledge that carry-over effects of emotions can in fact influence 
the reservation price of a customer can thus merely add a few more ideas to consider to this 
science, probably rather in situations that involve some bargaining. Also the profit margins 
probably need to be high enough to justify such measures, whereas for everyday consumer 
goods it should at least be made sure that consumers are not in an adverse emotional state. 
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 6. Status quo  
  
The status quo is an important influence to be considered not only in default options 
but also in pricing decisions or negotiations about new terms of agreement. Even small 
deviations from the reference point might be seen as a big deal, whereas not allowing for 
much improvement might not be noticed so much. This is to say that this should be accounted 
for in negotiation techniques to facilitate compromises that are not deemed unfair or a rise in 
prices that seems uncalled-for.   
 
7. Other areas of application 
 
Finally it is noteworthy that the endowment effect and loss aversion do not only apply 
for buying decisions. Another area that is affected by the difference in valuation of a good 
before or after it is part of someone’s endowment is for example the jurisdiction. Many legal 
decisions have retroactive consequences, therefore the fact that it is not the same if one failed 
to acquire something or if it has to be given up should be accounted for. One example of 
practical application in legal use is the division of goods in the course of a divorce, where 
usually the party who brought the good into the union is granted it after the separation.  
 
V. Future research  
 
Even though the endowment effect was only uncovered a few decades ago, the 
literature is already fairly abundant and comprises a lot of different aspects of the 
phenomenon. But the subject is far from being totally explored, and new articles are published 
every year, so the available knowledge is rapidly growing further.  
 Still because the endowment effect is interlinked with so many other economically 
relevant theories as well as everyday decisions and behaviour, there remain a multitude of 
unclear and unexplored thoughts. A few open questions that seem worth further investigations 
shall be mentioned hereafter.  
 
1. Multiple units of a good  
 
Since most objects that are traded are not unique but mass-marketed products, it is not 
unlikely to assume that either sellers or buyers have another example of the good to be traded. 
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 Therefore the question how a second, third or tenth item affects the endowment effect is not 
only interesting, but can be quite relevant for everyday life and economics.  
Morewedge et al. (2009) have shown that buyers who already own one example of a 
good are willing to pay more for a second identical item, therefore trade occurs at a higher 
price level and the endowment effect is minimized. Ownership of one exemplar thus is 
enough to influence WTA and WTP. 
But how many units of a good are necessary to influence sellers’ loss aversion? Do 
owners still suffer from loss aversion even if they have more than one item of sorts, so they 
still get to keep at least one for themselves after the transaction? Is there a maximum number 
of identical objects for which there is loss aversion, and after that any additional item can be 
traded with diminishing endowment effect? Research in this direction should also consider 
that some objects could be more valuable in pairs or bigger numbers.  
 
2. Multiple products  
 
Most experiments only focus on eliciting an endowment effect for one product per 
participant under varying circumstances, mainly for simplicity reasons. But in everyday life 
we are frequently confronted with several products and trading decisions at the same time. It 
could therefore be a relevant question to investigate whether the endowment effect is the same 
in magnitude, immediacy and persistence for every object in one’s possession, especially if 
the endowment is recent or if there are already some close substitutes among the possessions.  
Would a respondent show an equal endowment effect for every one of several items he 
got endowed with in the course of an experiment, or would there be a discernable primacy or 
recency effect, especially if the participant did not get a chance to use the objects he got?  
 
3. Time   
 
Is there a possibility to draw a curve for the evolution of the Endowment Effect as a 
function of elapsed time? We have seen that the Endowment Effect occurs instantly upon 
endowment, and sometimes even beforehand, but how long before it has reached its 
maximum? And especially for goods we do not really use anymore but cannot part with, does 
the endowment effect ever wear off, or does it lay dormant until the time we think about 
parting with the object? This is probably a question that will be difficult to elicit 
experimentally, but could be relevant for everyday trading decisions.   
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 4. Non-owner manipulations 
 
Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and van Dijk (2005) noticed that the discrepancy between 
participants’ valuations of a good and its actual objective value was much higher for non-
owners than for owners, and not only in their own experiments but also in other examples 
from the literature. They thus suggest that contrary to the usual assumption that the 
endowment effect is primarily due to sellers’ overvaluation, “the possibility that the 
endowment effect may be attributed to the Buyers’ behavior may provide new insights in the 
theory of the endowment effect. A further investigation of the behavior and motives of the 
Buyers may produce new insights into the causes and consequences of the endowment effect.” 
(p. 467)  
This idea is in opposition to the results from Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) 
that decomposed the gap between WTA and WTP into reluctance to buy and reluctance to sell 
as components of undertrading by comparison to the control group with the choice between 
mug and money. They found that the relative weight of reluctance to part with entitlements 
was significantly more important, so the endowment effect really can be primarily attributed 
to the sellers. This does not however rule out the possibility that buyers’ behaviour also 
contributes to the endowment effect.    
So the question remains why buyers’ valuations of the goods tend to be so low. Could 
it be that the products used in the experimental settings, though generally worthwhile, are just 
not really desired under those circumstances? If so, would the endowment effect be different 
in a real market, when buyers seek to buy products they want to acquire for themselves? A 
more profound analysis of the behaviour of non-owners could in fact lead to new insights and 
a critical review of existing theories.  
 
5. Product categories 
 
Another question that could have an influence on the practical application of the 
endowment effect theory is whether or not the increased valuation of a good in ones 
possession can be extended to the whole product category. If a person gets endowed with a 
mug, would the change in preference for this mug transfer to another mug as well, and mugs 
in general? Or could the increase in valuation of the owned item maybe also be transferred to 
the label, the company that produced it, and their other products?   
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 This might of course be linked to other factors like the ownership source and  history 
as well, but eventually could be a thought worth considering when building and reinforcing 
loyalty.  
  
6. Undesired goods 
 
Loewenstein and Adler (1995) have shown that the endowment effect leads to 
considerable changes in people’s tastes they are not aware of beforehand. Given this power to 
influence tastes, could the simple ownership also change our tastes for a product we explicitly 
did not like before and make us like it simply because we own it? Is there an endowment 
effect and loss aversion for products we do not like?  
 This could be a relevant question for the application in the marketing mix, especially if 
companies give away a first free item of a good that then is more valuable in numbers and 
thus achieve a higher price for the consecutive pieces even though the consumers might not 
have had any intention to buy the product in the first place.   
An experimental treatment to test this theory could be to first give respondents a 
hypothetical choice between two different goods, and then assign one of the two goods 
randomly to half the participants and conduct a classical endowment effect eliciting 
experiment for each product. Thus by comparing the results of the different groups, more 
specifically the anticipated endowment effect for the desired good and the potential 
endowment effect for the initially undesired item, any difference in the magnitude of  the gap 
between WTA and WTP would reflect the effect of endowment on tastes for unwanted goods.  
 
7. Other influences 
 
There are a lot of other conceivable factors, psychological or circumstantial, that could 
be able to influence our valuation of a good and therefore our willingness to trade it, and the 
reservation price.  
The list of plausible influences can never be exclusive, but could comprise 
psychological correlates such as a sense of morality, fairness and justice reasoning, the 
cultural background and values, sympathy towards the exchange partner and evaluation of his 
financial situation, preconceived plans made about the desired good or its anticipation, as well 
as circumstantial factors such as spontaneity of the trade, time allowed for the decision, total 
amount of time invested in the whole bargain, experiences with the exchange partner or 
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 potential pressure from agents or peers in case of a group decision. Even though not all the 
factors will have a significant influence on their own, their combination could account for a 
substantial amount of undertrading.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The possibilities for future research seem as unlimited as the endowment effects 
influences and implications, and the ideas above are only a few possible directions for further 
investigations that seem promising. To fully understand such a complex phenomenon as the 
endowment effect and all its causes and consequences a lot more than that will be necessary. 
Fortunately economists worldwide have understood the importance of the effect that has impacts 
not only on fundamental economic theories but also unconsciously manifests in our everyday life, 
so that a lot of research is currently done and new articles are constantly being released all over 
the world. The present work is therefore only a survey of the existing literature and does not claim 
to be either complete or concluding. 
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 German summary 
 
Alles hat seinen Preis. Nur entspricht dieser Preis nicht immer dem Wert den wir einer 
Sache beimessen. Die gegenwärtige Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Phänomen, dass die 
Summe die wir bereit sind für etwas auszugeben (“willingness to pay“, WTP) und die Höhe 
der Entgeltung die wir für die Abgabe derselben Sache verlangen sobald sie uns gehört 
(“willingness to accept“, WTA) oft merklich auseinander liegen. Ein Überblick über den 
aktuellen Stand der Literatur dient als ein Erklärungsversuch dieser oft deutlichen Diskrepanz.  
Ende der 70er Jahre haben erste Studien, die den Geldwert von öffentlichen Gütern 
erheben sollten gezeigt, dass die Angaben der befragten Personen deutliche Unterschiede 
aufwiesen, je nachdem wie die Fragen zur Bewertung formuliert wurden. Die hypothetischen 
Summen die die befragten Personen wenigstens bereit waren als Entschädigung für eine 
Verschlechterung der Ausgangssituation zu akzeptieren lagen weit über den hypothetischen 
Summen die sie bereit gewesen wären aufzubringen um eine Verbesserung der Ausgangslage 
zu bewirken. Dieser Widerspruch führte zu einer ganzen Reihe verschiedenster Studien die 
sich mit der Frage beschäftigten: Wie hoch ist der wahrgenommene Wert einer Sache, und 
wieso steht dieser mit den Besitzverhältnissen in Zusammenhang? 
In der Literatur zeigt sich, dass hypothetische Werte generell höher sind als tatsächlich 
gebotene Summen in realen Experimenten und dass man außerdem stets darauf achten sollte 
dass die Erhebungsmethode den Teilnehmern auch den Anreiz bietet, ihren tatsächlichen 
Reservationspreis zu nennen. Die bekannteste und bewährteste Methode dazu wurde von 
Becker, DeGroot und Marschak (1964) beschrieben. Gleichgültig jedoch mit welcher 
Methode die Werte für WTA und WTP letztendlich erhoben wurden, die Diskrepanz 
zwischen den beiden Werten bleibt bestehen.  
Es wurden mehrere Theorien als Erklärungsversuch hierfür entwickelt, die 
mittlerweile Geläufigste und universell Anerkannte ist die Theorie des Besitztumseffektes, 
erstmals definiert von Thaler (1980) als die Wertsteigerung eines Gutes für eine Person wenn 
es in den Besitz der Person eintritt. Diese Theorie wurde ergänzend überarbeitet in dem 
Artikel von Kahneman, Knetsch und Thaler (1990) der als Grundlage für die Theorie des 
Besitztumseffektes gilt. In dem Artikel werden vor allem alternative Erklärungsversuche 
widerlegt und durch eine Reihe verschiedener Experimente wird immer wieder bestätigt, dass 
der Besitztumseffekt kein Fehler sondern ein nachhaltiger Beweis des Einflusses von 
Referenzpunkten auf unsere Präferenzen ist. Der Verkauf eines Gutes aus unserem Besitz 
wird als Verlust desselben empfunden, der Erwerb eines Gutes als Gewinn. Da die negativen 
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 Konsequenzen eines Verlustes jedoch deutlicher wahrgenommen werden als die positiven 
Folgen eines Gewinnes verlangt der Verkäufer eine zu hohe Entschädigung für seine 
Verlustaversion, die der Käufer oftmals nicht bereit ist zu zahlen.  
Eine andere Theorie zur Erklärung der Diskrepanz zwischen WTA und WTP ist unter 
anderem die von Hanemann (1991) entwickelte Theorie der Substituierbarkeit, die besagt dass 
je leichter ein Gut durch ein anderes, gleichwertiges, gehandeltes Gut ersetzt werden kann, 
desto weniger werden die Werte für Kauf- und Verkaufspreis auseinander liegen. Hat ein Gut 
jedoch keine oder nur unzulängliche Substitute, wie zum Beispiel die eigene Gesundheit, so 
kann der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Werten ins Unendliche gehen. Weitere jedoch 
nicht so bedeutende Theorien beschäftigen sich mit asymmetrischer 
Informationsverarbeitung, Ungewißheit oder ungenauen und intrinsischen Werten.  
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit den Einflußfaktoren auf den 
Besitztumseffekt. Verschiedene Forschungsarbeiten haben gezeigt dass, wie Kahneman et Al.  
in ihrem Artikel schon vorweggenommen haben, der Besitztumseffekt nicht ausschließlich 
bei materiellen Konsumgütern auftritt, sondern ebenfalls für Handelsgüter, Zeit, Geld oder 
Informationen nachweisbar ist. Weiters wurde durch Forschungsergebnisse bestätigt dass 
auch sozioökonomische Faktoren wie Alter, Bildung und Einkommen, sowie persönliche 
Erfahrungen und Erfahrung mit dem Markt Einfluss auf die Höhe des Besitztumseffektes 
haben, und dass sich die Stimmung der Handelspartner auf die Preise auswirken kann. Von 
psychologischer Seite ist bemerkenswert dass, obwohl der Besitztumseffekt sich bei allen 
erdenklichen Käufen und Verkäufen die wir tätigen manifestiert, wir uns seiner dennoch nicht 
bewußt sind. Dadurch können wir auch weder unseren Eigenen noch den unseres 
Handelspartners antizipieren oder in Angeboten berücksichtigen. Bei gescheiterten 
Transaktionen wird der Besitztumseffekt außerdem nicht als mögliche Ursache erkannt, so 
dass kein produktiver Lerneffekt für die Zukunft stattfinden kann.  
Es bietet sich eine Vielzahl von Möglichkeiten zur Berücksichtigung des 
Besitztumseffektes in der Unternehmenspraxis. So sollten zum Beispiel bei der Erstellung des 
Marketing-Mix die standardisierten Produkteigenschaften und die Fristen für Rückgaberechte, 
bei Preisänderungen die Sensibilität für den Status Quo bedacht werden und eine Leihgabe für 
beschränkte Zeit könnte sich positiv auf die Zahlungsbereitschaft auswirken. 
 Weiterführende Forschungsarbeiten scheinen vor allem bei Problemstellungen mit 
mehreren Gütern vielversprechend, aber auch in Bezug auf Käuferverhalten und 
psychologische Zusammenhänge, da der Besitztumseffekt noch lange nicht gänzlich erforscht 
ist.  
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